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Abstract— Rigorous privacy mechanisms that can cope with
dynamic data are required to encourage a wider adoption of
large-scale monitoring and decision systems relying on end-
user information. A promising approach to develop these
mechanisms is to specify quantitative privacy requirements at
design time rather than as an afterthought, and to rely on
signal processing techniques to achieve satisfying trade-offs
between privacy and performance specifications. This paper
discusses, from the signal processing point of view, an event
stream analysis problem introduced in the database and cryp-
tography literature. A discrete-valued input signal describes the
occurrence of events contributed by end-users, and a system is
supposed to provide some output signal based on this informa-
tion, while preserving the privacy of the participants. The notion
of privacy adopted here is that of event-level differential privacy,
which provides strong privacy guarantees and has important
operational advantages. Several mechanisms are described to
provide differentially private output signals while minimizing
the impact on performance. These mechanisms demonstrate the
benefits of leveraging system theoretic techniques to provide
privacy guarantees for dynamic systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Privacy issues associated with emerging large-scale mon-
itoring and decision systems are receiving an increasing
amount of attention. Indeed, privacy concerns are already
resulting in delays or cancellations in the deployment of
smart grids, location-based services, or civilian unmanned
aerial systems [1]. In order to encourage the adoption of these
systems, which can have important societal benefits, new
mechanisms providing clear and rigorous privacy protection
guarantees are needed.
Unfortunately, providing such guarantees for a system
generally involves sacrificing some level of performance.
Evaluating the resulting trade-offs rigorously requires a
quantitative definition of privacy, and in the last few years
the notion of differential privacy has emerged essentially as
a standard specification [2]. Intuitively, a system receiving
inputs from end-users is differentially private if one cannot
infer from its observable behavior if any specific individual
contributed its data or not. Other quantitative notions of
privacy have been proposed, e.g., [3], [4], but the differential
privacy definition has important operational advantages. In
particular, it does not require modeling the available auxiliary
information that can be linked to the output of the system
of interest to create privacy breaches. Moreover, it is an
achievable privacy goal despite the fact that a database on
which an individual has no influence could still potentially
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leak information about her in the presence of arbitrary
auxiliary information [2].
Nevertheless, differential privacy is a very strong notion of
privacy and might require large perturbations to the published
results of an analysis in order to hide the presence of
individuals. This is especially true for applications where
users continuously contribute data over time, and it is thus
important to design advanced mechanisms that can limit
the impact on system performance of differential privacy
requirements. Previous work on designing differentially pri-
vate mechanisms for the publication of time-series include
[5], [6], but these mechanisms are not causal and hence
not suited for real-time applications. The papers [7]–[9]
provide real-time mechanisms to approximate a few specific
filters transforming user-contributed input event streams into
public output streams. For example, [7], [8] consider a
private accumulator providing the total number of events that
occured in the past. This paper is inspired by this scenario,
and builds on our previous work on this problem [10, Section
IV] [11, Section VI].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
provides some technical background on differential privacy
and describes a basic mechanism enforcing privacy by inject-
ing white Gaussian noise. Section III describes the real-time
event stream filtering scenario of interest. In Section IV, we
optimize architectures based on linear estimators to provide
real-time private filters with reduced impact on performance.
Section V attempts at leveraging the knowledge that the
input stream takes values in a discrete set, by considering
slightly non-linear structures based on decision-feedback
equalization. Finally, we conclude with a brief illustrative
example in Section VI.
II. DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
In this section we review the notion of differential privacy
[12] as well as a basic mechanism that can be used to achieve
it when the released data belongs to a finite-dimensional
vector space. We refer the reader to the surveys by Dwork,
e.g., [2], for additional background on differential privacy,
and to [11] for the proofs of the results in this section.
A. Definition
Let us fix some probability space (Ω,F ,P). Let D be a
space of datasets of interest (e.g., a space of data tables,
or a signal space). A mechanism is a map M : D × Ω →
R, for some measurable output space R, such that for any
element d ∈ D, M(d, ·) is a random variable, typically writen
simply M(d). A mechanism can be viewed as a probabilistic
algorithm to answer a query q, which is a map q : D→ R.
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Next, we introduce the definition of differential privacy.
Intuitively in the following definition, D is a space of datasets
of interest, and we have a symmetric binary relation Adj on
D, called adjacency, such that Adj(d, d′) if and only if d and
d′ differ by the data of a single participant.
Definition 1: Let D be a space equipped with a symmetric
binary relation denoted Adj, and let (R,M) be a measurable
space. Let , δ ≥ 0. A mechanism M : D×Ω→ R is (, δ)-
differentially private if for all d, d′ ∈ D such that Adj(d, d′),
we have
P(M(d) ∈ S) ≤ eP(M(d′) ∈ S) + δ, ∀S ∈M. (1)
If δ = 0, the mechanism is said to be -differentially private.
The definition says that for two adjacent datasets, the
distributions over the outputs of the mechanism should be
close. The choice of the parameters , δ is set by the privacy
policy. Typically  is taken to be a small constant, e.g.,
 ≈ 0.5 or perhaps even ln p for some small p ∈ N. The
parameter δ should be kept small as it controls the probability
of certain significant losses of privacy, e.g., when a zero
probability event for input d′ becomes an event with positive
probability for input d in (1).
A fundamental property of the notion of differential pri-
vacy is that no additional privacy loss can occur by simply
manipulating an output that is differentially private. To state
it, recall that a probability kernel between two measurable
spaces (R1,M1) and (R2,M2) is a function k : R1×M2 →
[0, 1] such that k(·, S) is measurable for each S ∈ M2 and
k(r, ·) is a probability measure for each r ∈ R1.
Theorem 1 (Resilience to post-processing): Let M1 : D×
Ω→ (R1,M1) be an (, δ)-differentially private mechanism.
Let M2 : D × Ω → (R2,M2) be another mechanism, such
that there exists a probability kernel k : R1 ×M2 → [0, 1]
verifying
P(M2(d) ∈ S|M1(d)) = k(M1(d), S), a.s., (2)
for all S ∈ M2 and d ∈ D. Then M2 is (, δ)-differentially
private.
Note that in (2), the kernel k is not allowed to depend
on the dataset d. In other words, this condition says that
once M1(d) is known, the distribution of M2(d) does not
further depend on d. The theorem says that a mechanism
M2 accessing a dataset only indirectly via the output of
a differentially private mechanism M1 cannot weaken the
privacy guarantee.
B. A Basic Differentially Private Mechanism
A mechanism that throws away all the information in a
dataset is obviously private, but not useful, and in general one
has to trade off privacy for utility when answering specific
queries. We recall below a basic mechanism that can be used
to answer queries in a differentially private way. We are only
concerned in this section with queries that return numerical
answers, i.e., here a query is a map q : D → R, where the
output space R equals Rk for some k > 0, is equipped with
a norm denoted ‖ · ‖R, and the σ-algebra M on R is taken
to be the standard Borel σ-algebra. The following quantity
plays an important role in the design of differentially private
mechanisms [12].
Definition 2: Let D be a space equipped with an adjacency
relation Adj. The sensitivity of a query q : D→ R is defined
as
∆Rq := max
d,d′:Adj(d,d′)
‖q(d)− q(d′)‖R.
In particular, for R = Rk equipped with the p-norm ‖x‖p =(∑k
i=1 |xi|p
)1/p
, for p ∈ [1,∞], we denote the `p sensitivity
by ∆pq.
A differentially private mechanism proposed in [13] modi-
fies an answer to a numerical query by adding iid zero-mean
Gaussian noise. Recall the definition of the Q-function
Q(x) := 1√
2pi
∫ ∞
x
e−
u2
2 du.
We have the following theorem [11], [13].
Theorem 2: Let q : D → Rk be a query. Then the
Gaussian mechanism Mq : D×Ω→ Rk defined by Mq(d) =
q(d) + w, with w ∼ N (0, σ2Ik), where σ ≥ ∆2q2 (K +√
K2 + 2) and K = Q−1(δ), is (, δ)-differentially private.
For the rest of the paper, we define
κδ, =
1
2
(K +
√
K2 + 2),
so that the standard deviation σ in Theorem 2 can be
written σ(δ, ) = κδ,∆2q. It can be shown that κδ, be-
haves roughly as O(ln(1/δ))1/2/. For example, to guarantee
(, δ)-differential privacy with  = ln(2) and δ = 0.05, the
standard deviation of the Gaussian noise introduced should
be about 2.65 times the `2-sensitivity of q.
III. FILTERING EVENT STREAMS
We now turn to the description of our scenario of interest,
similar to the one introduced in [7], [14]. A system receives
an input signal u = {ut}t≥0 with values in the discrete
set
{±k2 , k ∈ N}. Such a signal can for example record the
number of occurrences of certain events of interest at each
period (we centered the values around zero for convenience
later on). Similarly to [7], [14], two signals u and u′ are
adjacent if and only if they differ at a single time by at most
d, or equivalently
Adjd(u, u′) iff u− u′ = k δt0 , |k| ≤ d, for some t0, (3)
where δt0 denotes the discrete impulse at t0. The motiva-
tion for this adjacency relation is that a given individual
contributes events to the stream at a single time only,
and we want to preserve event-level privacy [7], that is,
hide to some extent the presence or absence of an event
at a particular time. This could for example prevent the
inference of individual transactions from publicly available
collaborative filtering outputs, as in [15].
Even though individual events should be hidden, we would
like to release a filtered version Fu of the original signal,
where F is a given causal stable linear time-invariant system.
Note that in this paper, all signals and filter coefficients are
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Fig. 1. Differentially private filter approximation set-up. For v to be
differentially private, we take n to be a white Gaussian noise with variance
E[|nt|2] = d2κ2δ,‖G‖22.
assumed to be real-valued, and all systems are single-input
single-output. Privacy preserving approximations of F can
be developed based on the following sensitivity calculation.
Lemma 3: Let G be a linear time-invariant system with
impulse response g := {gt}t. Then, for the adjacency relation
(3) on binary-valued input signals, the `p sensitivity of G is
∆pG = d‖g‖p. In particular for p = 2, we have ∆2G =
d‖G‖2, where ‖G‖2 is the H2 norm of G.
Proof: For two adjacent binary-valued signals u, u′, we
have
‖Gu−Gu′‖p = ‖G(u− u′)‖p = d‖g ∗ δt0‖p
= d‖{gt−t0}t‖p = d‖g‖p.
This leads to the following theorem, generalizing Theorem
2 to dynamic systems. Certain technical measurability issues
in the proof of this result are resolved in [11].
Theorem 4: The mechanism M(u) = Gu + n, where n
is a Gaussian white noise with covariance d2κ2δ,‖G‖22, is
(, δ)-differentially private for the adjacency relation (3).
Theorem 4 can now be combined with Theorem 1 to obtain
a family of privacy preserving mechanisms approximating
F , as illustrated on Fig. 1. On that figure, the signal v is
differentially private, and hence yˆ as well by the resilience
to post-processing property (Theorem 1). Two extreme cases
include G = id, called input perturbation, and H = id, called
output perturbation. In general however, these two choices
can exhibit very poor performance [10]. Throughout this
paper, we measure the precision of specific approximations
by the mean square error (MSE) between the published and
desired outputs, i.e.,
lim
T→∞
1
T
∞∑
t=0
E[|et|2],
with e = y− yˆ. The next section is devoted to the description
of two ways of choosing the filters G,H as linear filters.
IV. LINEAR EQUALIZATION MECHANISMS
A. Linear Zero-Forcing Mechanism
We first recall a mechanism initially described in [10],
which we call here the Linear Zero-Forcing (LZF) mecha-
nism. Note that once the differentially private signal v =
Gu + n is obtained, the task of estimating y from v is
a standard estimation (or equalization) problem. The LZF
mechanism is based on the linear zero-forcing equalization
idea, and its main advantage is that it requires no statistical
information about the input signal u. Let G be a stable,
minimum phase filter (hence invertible). Let H = FG−1. To
guarantee (, δ)-differential privacy, the noise n is chosen to
be white Gaussian with variance d2κ2δ,‖G‖22. The MSE for
the LZF mechanism is then
ξLZF = d2κ2,δ‖G‖22‖FG−1‖22.
The best possible choice of filters G is then described in the
following theorem [10].
Theorem 5: We have, for any stable, minimum phase
system G,
ξLZF ≥ d2κ2,δ
(
1
2pi
∫ pi
−pi
|F (ejω)|dω
)2
.
This lower bound on the mean-squared error of the LZF
mechanism is attained by letting |G(ejω)|2 = λ|F (ejω)| for
all ω ∈ [−pi, pi), where λ is some arbitrary positive number.
It can be approached arbitrarily closely by stable, rational,
minimum phase transfer functions G.
Note that if |F (ejω)| satisfies the Paley-Wiener condition
1
2pi
∫ pi
−pi
log |F (ejω)|dω > −∞,
then it has a spectral factorization |F (ejω)| = φ+(ω)φ−(ω)
and the bound of Theorem 5 is attained by taking G with
impulse reponse
gk =
1
2pi
∫ pi
−pi
φ+(ω)ejωkdω, k ≥ 0.
Note also that the MSE obtained for the best LZF mechanism
in Theorem 5 is independent of the input signal u. The
design of H does not attempt to minimize the effect of the
noise n, as is the case with zero-forcing equalizers [16]. The
next section discusses another scheme that achieves a smaller
error but requires some additional public knowledge about
the statistics of the input signal u.
B. LMMSE Mechanism
The main issue with linear zero-forcing equalizers in
communication systems is the noise amplification behavior
at frequencies where |G(ejω)| is small, due to the inversion
in H = FG−1. However, this issue is not as problematic
for the optimal LZF mechanism, since in this case we es-
sentially have |H(ejω)| = √|F (ejω)|, i.e., the amplification
is compensated by the fact that |F (ejω)| and |G(ejω)| are
both small at the same frequencies. Nonetheless, in this
section we explore a scheme based on minimum mean square
equalization, which we call the Linear Minimum Mean
Square Error (LMMSE) mechanism, and which can exhibit
better performance than the LZF mechanism but requires
some additional knowledge about the second order statistics
of u. This scheme was briefly discussed in [10], but the
optimization of G described below was not performed in
that paper.
Hence, assume that that it is publicly known that u is
wide-sense stationary with know mean µ and autocorrelation
ru[k] = E[utut−k],∀k. Without loss of generality, we can
then assume µ to be zero, by substracting the known mean
of y equal to F (1)µ. The power spectral density of u is
denoted Pu, and is assumed to be rational for simplicity.
The LMMSE mechanism is based on designing the filter
H as a Wiener filter in order to estimate y from v. For
tractability reasons, we derive the performance of the non-
causal infinite impulse response Wiener filter, and optimize
the choice of G with respect to this choice for H . Once G
is fixed, real-time consideration issues can force us to use a
suboptimal design with H a causal Wiener filter, or perhaps
introducing a small delay.
The non-causal Wiener filter H has the transfer function
H(z) =
Pyv(z)
Pv(z)
,
where Pyv is the cross power spectral density of y and v.
Since w and u are uncorrelated, we have
Pyv(z) = Pu(z)F (z)G(z
−1).
As for Pv , we have, with n a white noise of variance σ2 =
d2κ2δ,‖G‖22,
Pv(z) = Pu(z)G(z)G(z
−1) + σ2.
Hence
H(z) =
Pu(z)F (z)G(z
−1)
Pu(z)G(z)G(z−1) + κ2δ,‖G‖22
. (4)
The MSE can then be expressed as
ξLMMSE =
1
2pi
∫ pi
−pi
Pu(e
jω)|F (ejω)|2
Pu(ejω)
d2κ2δ,
|G(ejω)|2
‖G‖22 + 1
dω. (5)
Note that we recover the LZF mechanism in the limit
Pu(e
jω) >> d2κ(δ, )2.
1) Privacy-Preserving Filter Optimization: A close-to-
optimal filter G for the LMMSE mechanism can then be
obtained by optimization, assuming initially that the recon-
struction is done with the non-causal Wiener filter H . We
discretize (5) at the set of frequencies ωi = ipiN , i = 0 . . . N .
Note that all functions in the integral (5) are even functions
of ω, hence we can restrict out attention to the interval [0, pi].
We then define the N + 1 variables
xi =
|G(ejωi)|2
‖G‖22
, xi ≥ 0, (6)
and the nonnegative constants
αi = Pu(e
jωi)|F (ejωi)|2, i = 0, . . . N
βi =
Pu(e
jωi)
d2κ2δ,
, i = 0, . . . N.
The minimization of the error (5) leads to the following
problem (using a trapezoidal approximation of the integrals)
min
x
1
2N
N−1∑
i=0
αi
βixi + 1
+
αi+1
βi+1xi+1 + 1
(7)
s.t.
1
2N
N−1∑
i=0
xi + xi+1 = 1 (8)
xi ≥ 0, i = 0, . . . N.
Note that the constraint (8) comes from the fact that
1
pi
∫ pi
0
|G(ejω)|2
‖G‖22
dω =
1
2pi
∫ pi
−pi
|G(ejω)|2
‖G‖22
dω = 1.
The optimization problem (7) is convex, and can thus be
solved efficiently even for fine discretizations of the interval
[0, pi]. The transfer function of the filter G can then be
obtained for example by simple interpolation.
Remark 1: Even if the statistical assumptions on u turn
out not to be correct, the differential privacy guarantee of
the LMMSE mechanism still holds and only its performance
is impacted.
2) Causal Mechanism: The previous description of the
LMMSE mechanism involves a possibly non-causal filter H .
Sometimes, the anti-causal part of this filter might have a fast
decreasing impulse response, in which case the scheme can
be implemented approximately by introducing a small delay
in the release of the output signal yˆ. Otherwise, we need to
implement a causal Wiener filter H . Denoting the spectral
factorization of Pv
Pv(z) = γ
2
vQv(z)Qv(z
−1),
we then have
H(z) =
1
γ2vQv(z)
[
Pyv(z)
Qv(z−1)
]
+
,
where, for a linear filter L with impulse reponse
{lt}−∞≤t≤∞, [L(z)]+ denotes the causal filter with impulse
response {lt1{t≥0}}t. Due to the more complex expression
for H and the resulting MSE, the design of the optimal filter
G in this case is left for future work. Here, we optimize
G assuming a possibly non-causal filter H , and then simply
modify H afterwards if causality needs to be enforced.
V. DECISION-FEEDBACK MECHANISMS
In general, solutions to the problem of reconstructing
the optimum maximum-likelihood estimator of {(Fu)k}k≥0
from {vk}k≥0 are computationally intensive and require
the knowledge of the full joint probability distribution of
{uk}k≥0 [16]. This is the main reason why simpler lin-
ear architectures such as the one described in Section IV
are more often implemented in communication receivers.
However, so far, we have not exploited in the estimation
procedures the knowledge that the input signal takes discrete
values (or perhaps is even binary valued, as in [7], [8]).
This can be done by introducing only a slight degree of
nonlinearity, using the idea of decision-feedback equalization
H1G
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Fig. 2. Decision-feedback mechanism. The decision block is nonlinear
and depends on the knowledge about the input signal u, acting as a
detector/quantizer.
[16]. We call the resulting mechanism a Decision-Feedback
(DF) mechanism. Its architecture is depicted on Fig. 2.
The second stage of a DF mechanism consists of a
forward filter H1, a nonlinear decision procedure (detector
or quantizer) to estimate u from u˜, which exploits the fact
that u takes discrete values, and a filter H2 that feeds back
the previous symbol decisions to correct the intermediate
estimate u˜. H2 is assumed to be strictly causal, but gener-
ally H1 is taken to be non-causal in standard equalizers,
for better performance [17]. Hence, DF mechanisms will
typically introduce a small delay in the publication of the
output signal yˆ. In the absence of detailed information about
the distribution of u, the decision device can be a simple
quantizer for integer valued input sequences, or a detector
uˆk = sign(u˜k) for binary valued input sequences.
DF equalizers have a long history, and approximate ex-
pressions for their MSE can be derived [17]. For tractability
reasons, these derivations invariably make the simplifying
assumption that the decisions uˆ that enter the feedback
filter are correct, i.e., uˆ ≡ u. Unfortunately, it appears that
optimizing G for the resulting approximate expression of the
MSE is often not a good strategy, because the simplification
results in a filter G that does not need to be adapted to
the query F any more (only to Pu). Still, we detail this
optimization below and discuss an alternative design strategy
for G at the end of the section.
The error between the desired output Fu and the signal
Fu˜, where u˜ is the input of the detector, is
e = F (u− u˜) = F (u−H1v +H2uˆ),
which, under the standard but simplifying assumption that
uˆ ≡ u, gives
e ≈ F (Bu−H1v),
with B(z) = 1 + H2(z) a monic filter (since H2 is strictly
causal). As in section IV-B, minimizing this approximate
error (over possibly non-causal filters) requires H1 to satisfy
H1(z) = B(z)
Puv(z)
Pv(z)
= B(z)
Pu(z)G(z
−1)
Pu(z)G(z)G(z−1) + d2κ2δ,‖G‖22
.
For this choice of H1, the approximate MSE becomes
ξDF ≈ 1
2pi
∫ pi
−pi
Pu(e
jω)|B(ejω)|2|F (ejω)|2
Pu(ejω)
d2κ2δ,
|G(ejω)|2
‖G‖22 + 1
dω. (9)
Assuming now the spectral factorizations
Pu(e
jω) = γ2u|Qu(ejω)|2
|F (ejω)|2 = γ2F |QF (ejω)|2
Pu(e
jω)
d2κ2δ,
|G(ejω)|2
‖G‖22
+ 1 = γ2|Q(ejω)|2,
with Q,Qu and QF canonical filters (monic, causal and
minimum-phase), the approximate error (9) can be mini-
mized by setting
B(z) =
Q(z)
Qu(z)QF (z)
.
The minimum approximate MSE is then
ξDF ≈ γ
2
uγ
2
F
γ2
(10)
≈ γ2uγ2F exp
(
− 1
2pi
∫ pi
−pi
ln
(
Pu(e
jω)
d2κ2δ,
|G(ejω)|2
‖G‖22
+ 1
)
dω
)
.
The last expression is based on a well-known formula for
γ2, see [18, p.105]. Hence we see that an artifact of this
approach is that the influence of F and G is decoupled,
and thus the minimization of (10) over G leads to a solution
that is independent of F , which is generally undesirable. For
example, for u iid with Pu(ejω) ≡ 1, optimizing (10) gives
the trivial solution G(ejω) ≡ 1, and the whole mechanism
reduces to an input perturbation scheme with an additional
decision stage. Nonetheless, for completeness we mention
that optimizing (10) over the choice of G can be done using
a discretization approach similar to the one used in Section
IV-B.1, now solving the convex optimization problem
max
x
1
2N
N−1∑
i=0
ln(βixi + 1) + ln(βi+1xi+1 + 1) (11)
s.t.
1
2N
N−1∑
i=0
xi + xi+1 = 1
xi ≥ 0, i = 0, . . . N.
In view of these issues, we mention an alternative design
strategy for DF-mechanisms. Note from (4) that the (non-
causal) LMMSE mechanism involves a reconstruction filter
H(z) = F (z)Hu(z), with Hu the LMMSE estimator for
u. Therefore we can interpret the DF mechanism on Fig. 2
as introducing an additional stage to the linear mechanisms,
to discretize the estimate of u, and replacing Hu by H1.
A strategy to improve on the performance of the LMMSE
(or LZF) mechanism is then to keep the same prefilter G
designed in Section IV-B, but simply replace the Wiener filter
by a decision-feedback equalizer. Our preliminary results
tend to confirm that good performance is achievable with
this strategy.
VI. EXAMPLE
Consider approximating the filter
F (z) =
1 + 0.995z−1
1− 0.995z−1 ,
with the privacy parameters set to  = ln 3, δ = 0.05. The
(wide-sense stationary) input signal is assumed to be binary
valued, i.e., ut ∈
{± 12} for all t, with zero mean and power
spectral density
Pu(z) =
3/4(
1− 12z−1
) (
1− z2
) .
Such a signal can be generated by a two-state Markov chain
in the stationary regime, with transition probability matrix[
3/4 1/4
1/4 3/4
]
,
one state corresponding to the input −1/2, and the other
state corresponding to the input 1/2, see, e.g., [19]. In this
context we can imagine that the transitions are generated
by individual users, and we want to prevent an adversary
analyzing the trace {(Fu)t}t to infer with confidence in
which state the chain was at a particular time.
We designed four mechanism: LZF, LMMSE with G
optimized based on (7), DF with G optimized based on (11),
and DF with the same G as for the LMMSE mechanism. The
DF estimators introduce a 5-period delay in the production
of the estimate (finite impulse response equalizers were
implemented here, based on [17]). Typical sample paths for
these four mechanisms are shown on Fig. 3. The theoretical
root MSE (RMSE) for the LZF and (non-causal) LMMSE
mechanisms are 8.82 and 7.43 respectively. We see that
the DF mechanisms significantly reduces the fluctuations in
the produced output. Moreover, the LMMSE pre-filter G
leads to a clearly better performance for the DF mechanism
than the one based on (11) in this case. The magnitude
of the frequency response |G(ejω)| is shown on Fig. 4
for both filters. The cutoff of the LMMSE pre-filter occurs
much earlier, taking into account the fact that F filters the
high frequencies of u anyway, and this helps to reduce the
degradation due to the privacy-preserving noise n.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS
In this paper, we have described several estimation tech-
niques that can be leveraged to minimize the impact on
performance of a differential privacy specification for the
filtering of event streams. The architecture considered here
for the privacy mechanisms decomposes the problem into a
standard equalization problem, for which many alternatives
techniques could be used, and a first-stage privacy-preserving
filter optimization problem. Future work on differentially
private filtering for event streams includes enforcing privacy
in scenarios where a single end-user can generate events at
multiple times, optimizing SIMO and MIMO architectures
from a state-space perspective, and adaptive mechanisms that
work in the absence of statistics for the input signals.
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